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Résumé
Le présent article critique la façon dont on décrit communément le gouvernement d’Evo 
Morales, en Bolivie, comme socialiste révolutionnaire ou réformiste radical. Il introduit 
le concept de populisme ascendant autochtone pour mieux comprendre le caractère du 
gouvernement de Morales. Il résume l’importance historique de la victoire électorale du 
MAS (Mouvement vers le socialisme); il situe la politique bolivienne d’aujourd’hui au 
sein des débats théoriques plus larges marquant la gauche latino-américaine; et il explique 
la trajectoire du populisme latino-américain, ainsi que les particularités de l’expérience 
bolivienne dans cette trajectoire. Sur ce fond théorique et historique, sont examinées deux 
mobilisations du peuple, en 2006 et 2007 : un conflit dans une mine d’Huanuni, en octobre 
2006, et les affrontements de Cochabamba, en décembre 2006 et janvier 2007. Ces deux 
événements étayent la thèse du populisme ascendant autochtone. L’article avance qu’il faut 
un renouvellement de l’auto-organisation indépendante et de la mobilisation stratégique 
des classes populaires et des nations autochtones pour permettre aux mouvements sociaux 
de dépasser l’horizon politique limité du gouvernement actuel.
Abstract
This paper critiques common depictions of the Evo Morales government in Bolivia as 
revolutionary socialist or radically reformist. It introduces the concept of indigenous 
ascendant populism to better understand the character of the Morales administration. It 
summarizes the historical significance of the electoral victory of the Movement Towards 
Socialism (MAS); situates contemporary Bolivian politics within the broader theoretical 
debates occurring within the Latin American left; and explains the trajectory of Latin 
American populism and the particularities of Bolivia’s experiences within that trajectory. 
Against this theoretical and historical backdrop two popular mobilizations occurring in 
2006 and 2007 are examined: a conflict in a Huanuni mine in October 2006 and the 
‘Cochabamba Conflict’ of December 2006 and January 2007. Both events are found to 
substantiate the thesis of indigenous ascendant populism. The contention is made that a 
renewal of independent self-organization and strategic mobilization of the popular classes 
and indigenous nations is necessary so that social movements will not be trapped within 
the limited political horizons of the current government. 
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Introduction
This essay introduces the concept of indigenous ascendant populism as a way to better 
understand the character of the current Bolivian government, led by president Evo 
Morales, of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism (MAS)). It 
begins with a brief overview of the historical significance of the electoral victory of the 
MAS in late December 2005. From here it attempts to situate the processes of social 
change occurring in Bolivia today within the wider theoretical debates on left strategy in 
Latin America. This discussion includes a synopsis of the historical and contemporary 
significance of populism in the region, as well as a description of Bolivia’s particular 
populist experiments.  After introducing this theoretical backdrop, the essay proceeds with 
a fine-grained empirical investigation. It seeks to fill a lacuna in analysis and reportage 
of the first year (January 2006 to January 2007) of the MAS administration in Bolivia 
through a detailed examination of two examples of popular revolt to the left of the MAS: 
the violent confrontations in a Huanuni mine in October 2006 and the ‘Cochabamba 
Conflict’ of January 2007.
The example of the mines represents one source of serious potential for the rearticulation 
of an independent radical politics to the left of the MAS, whereas the Cochabamba Conflict 
is much more ambiguous in its medium to long term implications. The inspiring struggle 
for the resignation of a corrupt and right-wing departmental prefect was clearly a positive 
example of a groundswell of democratic politics from below which refused, if only for a 
short period of time, to succumb to the dictates of the MAS government. However, the 
declaration of a ‘parallel government’ at the close of the conflict is best understood as 
ultra-left adventurism given that the social bases for such a project were no longer in place 
when the declaration was made. 
Effective struggle to open pathways for a transition to socialism, indeed even for serious 
structural reform, will require the renewal of self-activity, self-organization and strategic 
mobilization of popular movements autonomous from the MAS government.  The 
precedent of the 2000 to 2005 indigenous liberationist and anti-capitalist struggles of 
an eclectic array of indigenous-left movements is a good basis on which to build. The 
MAS government deserves the support of left-indigenous social movements throughout 
the country in its confrontations with the organized far right, concentrated in the eastern 
lowlands, and imperialism, concentrated in the US state. Any reforms initiated by the 
MAS that improve the lives of the popular classes and indigenous nations also deserve the 
critical support of social movements as they seek to drive these reforms deeper and direct 
them into more direct confrontations with the logic of capital. With a clear analysis of the 
reformist character of the MAS government - here theorized as indigenous ascendant 
populist – popular movements seeking the fundamental overthrow of the combined social 
relations of capitalism and indigenous oppression in Bolivia will be in a better position to 
  Thanks to Susan Spronk and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an early 
draft. All the usual disclaimers apply.
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wage struggles which escape the limited parameters of the MAS’s political agenda.
The Historical Significance of the MAS Government
Evo Morales was elected as the first indigenous president of Bolivia on December 8, 2005, 
with an unprecedented 53.7 percent of the popular vote. There was also a record turnout 
of 84.5 percent of eligible voters (Romero Ballivián, 2006). In South America’s poorest 
country, with an official poverty rate of 67 percent (EIU, 2006), the election was a hopeful 
expression of the popular classes’ will for change as well as a clear illustration of their 
disgust with the pauperizing, polarizing and exploitative characteristics of the neoliberal 
capitalist model2, first introduced in Bolivia in 985 (Dunkerley, 992; Dunkerley & 
Morales, 986; Kohl & Farthing, 2006). The victory of Morales was also symbolic. It 
signalled a break with white-mestizo (mixed race) elite control of the state apparatus in a 
republic where 62 percent of the population self-identified as indigenous in the last census 
of 200 (INE, 200), and where the indigenous majority has long struggled for political, 
social and economic liberation from internally-colonial race relations (Rivera Cusicanqui, 
2003). In a country where racial oppression and class exploitation are intimately 
intertwined, there was a palpable sense of hope that serious and substantive change might 
arise through the ballot box in December, 2005 (Blanco, 2006; Do Alto, 2006).
Within this context, a number of analysts have described the MAS government as either 
revolutionary socialist or radically reformist and anti-neoliberal in character3, often 
linking it to the harder current of Latin America’s so-called pink tide: Venezuela and 
Cuba. However, a growing body of literature argues that the MAS is not a revolutionary 
socialist government, although there remain disagreements in this literature as to how best 
to characterize the Morales regime.4  Few people disagree that in the opening years of the 
twenty-first century, Bolivia hosted the most dynamic and wide-scale popular movement 
resurgence in all of Latin America, while the region as a whole led the offensive against 
neoliberalism on a world-scale. In Bolivia, between 2000 and 2005 a monumental wave of 
left-indigenous rebellions in rural and urban contexts led to the ousting of two neoliberal 
presidents: Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003 and Carlos Mesa Gisbert in June 
2005.5 
The MAS played no meaningful role in the October 2003 rebellion, and only a peripheral 
one in the May-June 2005 revolt. The party had already, since 2002, steered away from 
its radically anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist origins in an effort to win over the urban 
2  Stefanoni & Do Alto (2006).
3  Borón (2005); Dieterich (2005); Lemoine (2005); Sader (2006); Stefanoni & Do Alto (2006).
4  CEDLA (2006c); Lora (2006); Orellana Aillón (2006a; 2006b); Petras (2006); Spronk (2007); 
Webber (2006b; 2006c; 2006d); Zibechi (2007).
5  Crabtree (2005); García Linera (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b; 2005); García Linera et 
al. (2005); Gómez (2004); Hylton & Thomson (2004; 2005; 2007); Kohl (2006); Mamani Ramírez 
(2004); Olivera & Lewis (2004); Perreault (2006).
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middle class and succeed in national elections. In the MAS’s first year in office deep 
patterns of continuity with the inherited neoliberal economic model have been discernible 
in terms of the implementation of key economic policies and the class interests they serve 
(Webber, 2007b). The only deviations in this trend are to be found in moderate reforms to 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas) policy, foreign relations with the governments of Venezuela and 
of Cuba, and relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially regarding 
Morales’ decision not to renew the Stand By Agreement with the IMF which expired in 
March 2006.6
The moderately reformist ideology of the dominant current within the party is best 
encapsulated by vice-president Álvaro García Linera’s conceptualization of Andean-
Amazonian capitalism, in which the possibility of socialist transformation is seen as 
impossible in the country for at least 50 to 00 years. For García Linera, the country 
needs to proceed through a stage of gradual and progressive development of industrial 
capitalism before an eventual socialist transition can take place. This intermediary stage 
is necessary for the development of the material basis necessary for socialism (García 
Linera, 2006a; 2006b). The most important document on economic planning released to 
date by the government likewise precludes the possibility of a transition to socialism in the 
foreseeable future (Ministerio de Planificación de Desarrollo, 2006). 
Bolivia is divided into nine departments, although the constitution concentrates political 
power in the central state apparatus. Despite the moderation of the Morales government, 
right-wing autonomist forces led by the bourgeoisies of the richest departments of the 
media luna (half moon) - Santa Cruz and Tarija - and their bourgeois allies in the poorest 
media luna departments - Pando and Beni - perceive the MAS administration as a serious 
threat to the neoliberal model from which they derived massive benefits since 985 (Chávez 
& García Linera, 2005; Eaton, 2007; Webber, 2005).7  Disputes within and outside the 
institutions of the state have boiled over repeatedly to such an extent that civil war was 
a real possibility at various junctures in 2006 (Bolpress, 2007b; International Crisis 
Group, 2007). These disputes turned primarily on the content and procedural rules of a 
complicated Constituent Assembly process, which is supposed to produce a new Bolivian 
constitution and which began in August 2006, and the future of the natural gas industry.
Much of the academic and popular discussion in this context has been centred on the 
conflict between the Bolivian left and the right. In these discussions, the MAS is often 
inaccurately portrayed as the singular left protagonist in an epoch struggle for hegemony 
in the country. The scene on the ground is much more complicated than such a portrait 
allows. There have been a number of instances where popular social forces to the left 
6  The moderate reforms in the hydrocarbons sector are frequently but incorrectly referred to as 
‘nationalization’.
7  The media luna refers to the departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija because together 
their geographical shape resembles a half moon.
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of the party have expressed their frustration with the reformism of the government and 
its unnecessary willingness to negotiate with the far right autonomist movement. This 
has sometimes led to confrontations between erstwhile allies of Morales and the MAS, 
such as the case in late September 2006 when, during a conflict in Parque Carrasco, two 
cocaleros (coca growers) were murdered by the state and called ‘narco-traffickers’ by 
key ministers in the government. This was especially galling given the fact that Morales 
and the MAS party grew up out of the milieu of anti-imperialist cocalero struggle in the 
region of Chapare, Cochabamba in the 980s and 990s. Many on the Bolivian left saw 
this as capitulation to US imperial intervention in the country by way of the American-led 
‘War on Drugs’.8  This was only one instance of many where the impulses of the popular 
classes and oppressed indigenous nations have transcended the compromised politics of 
the government in power. 
David McNally reminds us that: 
Most fundamental to Marx’s idea of revolution was the insistence that meaningful 
change can come only through a mass movement from below. Only by winning radical 
democracy for themselves, by conquering their own freedom, could the oppressed 
remake themselves as people capable of free self-government…. Revolution thus has 
two interrelated components: changing of social rules and regulation (ownership, 
property, forms of government) and self-transformation…. In short, the process 
of revolution – mass mobilization, participation in new forms of democracy, 
overturning old forms of domination, taking control of workplaces and communities 
– transforms the participants themselves (2006: 375-376).
In an equally important passage, McNally teases out a key insight of Rosa Luxemburg’s: 
[W]hoever wins an election in capitalist society attains political office, not power. 
After all, power in modern society is embedded in property – ownership of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange – and the authority it confers. This power, 
represented by money, involves control over others, specifically over the labour and 
life-activity of those who comprise the working class…. The great flaw of reformism 
is its belief that society can be radically transformed by changing governments while 
leaving the basic institutions and property relations of capitalism intact. The reality, 
however, is that rather than capturing power when they are elected, reformist parties 
are instead captured by power (2006: 358, 360).
For our purposes the premises of these two passages directs our attention in two directions: 
upwards, to the current MAS government in Bolivia and the structural limitations of 
its moderately reformist platform; and downwards, to the ongoing mass struggles from 
below which are attempting to push the current political and social processes in that 
8  Econoticias (2006b; 2006c); La Patria, (2006); La Prensa (2006a; 2006b); La Razón (2006g).
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country toward a transformative path while their participants transform themselves in the 
process. 
Theoretical Debates on the Latin American Left
Latin America is undergoing a complex and contradictory shift in its politics. Morales’ 
ascension to office occurred within this more general regional trend. The most discussed 
component of the new political climate since the late 990s has been the electoral victories 
of political parties defining themselves as left or centre-left, and running on explicitly 
anti-neoliberal platforms, whatever their policy decisions once in office. By 2006, such 
a dynamic, very broadly conceived, was evident in Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, although there are serious discrepancies 
between the actual class characters and orientations of these new governments.9  Less 
attention has been paid to the militant social movements and popular class struggles which 
have erupted most forcefully in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Ecuador in recent 
years. The effervescence of anti-neoliberal, and even anti-capitalist, social movements 
in Latin America and the subsequent rise of these centre-left and left governments, has 
fuelled a new wave of theoretical debate on left strategy.0 
One of the prominent schools of thought coming out of this conjuncture can be categorized 
loosely as anarchism, although certainly not all of the movements and thinkers that 
broadly adhere to this current think of themselves in this way. Perhaps the most widely-
celebrated thinker to have expressed the ideas of the new Latin American anarchism is 
John Holloway, particularly in his book Change the World without Taking Power (2005). 
His thesis, distilled to its barest elements, is as follows: it may or may not be possible to 
change the world without taking power (we cannot know for sure); within this context of 
uncertainty, the best way to imagine revolutionary change is to seek the dissolution of 
power rather than the conquest of power; and it is particularly important to avoid a strategy 
focused on the conquest of state power, which was ruinous for the revolutionary left in the 
twentieth century.
Many have pointed out important flaws in Holloway’s perspective: oversimplification of a 
very complex history of competing theoretical and strategic debates in the international 
history of the workers’ movement; too little account taken of a vast critical literature 
within the Marxist tradition on the state; lack of serious theoretical and analytical 
treatment of history and the role of the revolutionary left therein2; mystification of the 
9  Serious discussion of the Latin American Left must also include Cuba, but it is distinct from these 
electoral shifts for reasons that are straightforward.
0  Ali (2006); Castañeda (2005); Ciccariello-Maher (2007); Ellner (2004); Harnecker (2005; 2007); 
Hershberg & Rosen (2006); Katz (2007); Lebowitz (2006); Petras & Veltmeyer (2005); Prashad & 
Ballvé (2006); Wilpert (2006).
  Bensaïd (2005).
2  Bensaid (2005).
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Zapatista experience in Mexico through an analysis rooted in discourse rather than the 
real contradictions of the political situation on the ground; abandonment of the terrain of 
politics and strategic orientation, a vacuum which will inevitably be filled by capitalist or 
pro-capitalist forces if left empty3; and, finally, a problem Alex Callinicos has pointed out: 
Holloway’s suggestion that we should all try to “cultivate our own autonomous gardens 
despite the horrors of capitalism. The trouble is that the state won’t leave us alone and that 
is because capitalism itself, the system that different states sustain, won’t leave us alone” 
(Holloway & Callinicos, 2005: 63-64). To sum up, in the words of French theorist Daniel 
Bensaïd (2002):
 
You can pretend to ignore power, but it will not ignore you. You can act superior by 
refusing to take it, but from Catalonia 1937 to Chiapas, via Chile, experience shows 
right up to this very day that it will not hesitate to take you in the most brutal fashion. 
In a word, a strategy of counter-power only has any meaning in the perspective of dual 
power and its resolution. Who will come out on top?... which class will be capable 
of resolving the contradictions which are stifling society, capable of imposing an 
alternative logic to that of the accumulation of capital, capable of transcending the 
existing relations of production and opening up a new field of possibilities? 
The ideas that Holloway has sought to clarify need to be taken seriously and they continue 
to resonate in particular settings within the Latin American Left, especially among 
‘autonomists’ and ‘horizontalists’ in Argentina, and some adherents of Zapatismo in 
Mexico and elsewhere (Katz, 2005; Sitrin, 2006; Zibechi, 2003). 
Yet a second school within the theoretical debates on left strategy in Latin America, left 
populism, has gained a much higher stature than anarchism since the escalation of interest 
in the regimes of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia across the globe. 
There is a vast literature on the history of Latin American populism which I cannot delve 
into here.4  Suffice to say that since Chávez and Morales have gained increasing notoriety 
some theorists on the left have espoused left populism as the way forward in the current 
contexts of these countries. 
I want to set most of this heavily-trodden theoretical terrain aside and address two specific 
theoretical concepts: popular sector ascendant versus popular sector defensive populism 
in the Latin American historical context (Oxhorn, 998). Out of this discussion I develop a 
novel concept of indigenous ascendant populism to characterize the MAS government in 
Bolivia. I then show how indigenous ascendant populism is flawed as a strategic orientation 
for revolutionary socialists interested in building the capacities for socialist emancipation 
and indigenous liberation through the self-activity and self-organization of the oppressed 
3  Hearse (2005).
4  Conniff (999); de la Torre (992); Dornbusch & Edwards (992); Ellner (2004; 2005); Laclau 
(977); Mouzelis (985); Raby (2006).
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and exploited. 
Philip Oxhorn conceptualizes populism as a mode of interest intermediation characterized 
by four distinct features. First, populism is based on asymmetrical multi-class coalitions 
in which lower classes lack autonomous organizational capacity and therefore enjoy 
less power and reap fewer benefits than the more privileged sectors in the coalitional 
arrangement. Nonetheless, lower-class subordinate participation in the asymmetrical 
coalition is fundamentally important for the coalition’s successful access to the 
administrative apparatuses of the state and its resources. The success of populism “rests 
on its ability to appeal to lower class needs, frustrations and even aspirations” (Oxhorn, 
998: 223-224). Second, populism mobilizes broad popular support, but in a manner 
that strictly delimits the scope of demands and political horizons that might develop 
through more autonomous popular mobilization: “At the same time that populist leaders 
seek to mobilize the lower classes, they seek to restore control over them so as to avoid 
their radicalization” (Oxhorn, 998: 225). Populist regimes explicitly seek to forestall 
autonomous organizational activity through cooptation or repression or some combination 
of the two (Oxhorn, 998). Third, leadership under populism is paternalistic and elitist 
because this mode of interest intermediation is organized hierarchically from the top 
down. While classical definitions of populism often stressed the necessity of charismatic 
leadership, for Oxhorn it is not essential: “More important is the feeling that the leader 
is speaking for the underprivileged whom he directly represents” (998: 225). Fourth, 
and finally, populism employs an instrumental use of ideology. Ambiguity is critical in 
constructing ideological appeals that can resonate across a multi-class coalition. This 
fourth characteristic, in combination with the other three, crystallizes the distinctiveness 
of populism when juxtaposed to revolutionary socialism:
Despite the importance of at least some emphasis on distributional issues, there is 
also a fundamental ambiguity. Populist movements tend to downplay, or even oppose, 
class conflict. Instead, integration and the non-zero-sum nature of development are 
emphasized along with the ideal of expanding the economic pie. There is no real 
social change that is being proposed. Even during [Latin American] populism’s first 
wave [beginning in the 1930s], the economic power of the traditional elites was 
left intact in order to finance industrialization. Populist leaders sought concessions 
from upper classes rather than their overthrow (Oxhorn, 1998:226).
From the 930s until the 970s and 980s, populism in Latin America tended to 
pivot around the (unequal and limited) political incorporation of the popular classes. 
Redistributive measures targeted favoured groups within the populist coalition, including 
organized labour, while the poorest segments of society were most often still excluded. 
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Some redistribution was carried out on a particularistic basis through clientelism, but 
formal collective rights and benefits were also won by the organized working class in many 
countries (Oxhorn, 998). This first wave of Latin American populism is therefore termed 
popular sector ascendant populism in Oxhorn’s framework.  A second wave of populism 
began with the onset of neoliberal economic restructuring and is better characterized as 
popular sector defensive populism (Oxhorn, 998). The latter variant is based in part on 
the motivations of the popular sectors to defend the collective rights and benefits won 
in the first wave of populism in the face of an economic model that is premised on the 
institutional dismantlement and reduction/elimination of these rights and benefits. Under 
popular sector defensive populism, regimes have implemented targeted welfare programs 
at the local level for the poorest segments of society to secure support for neoliberalism; 
at the same time formal rights and benefits for the popular classes are eroded and the 
organizational bases for collective action steadily deteriorate. National level collective 
action is difficult outside of mobilization under the direction of the populist regime itself 
(Oxhorn, 998; Roberts, 995). Both variants of populism, despite their differences, share 
the key components of asymmetrical multi-class coalitions, the mobilization of popular 
support, paternalistic and elitist leadership, and instrumental use of ideology. 
Bolivia’s experience with popular sector ascendant populism began in the late 930s under 
the so-called ‘military socialism’ of David Toro and, subsequently, Germán Busch (Klein, 
969; Zavaleta Mercado, 998). Toro’s reformist regime created Bolivia’s first Ministry of 
Labour, and, most significantly, nationalized the New Jersey-based Standard Oil Company 
of Bolivia, establishing in its place the state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
de Bolivia (YPFB) (Klein, 2003). The Busch regime perpetuated military socialism with 
the introduction of additional moderate labour reforms that in no way threatened the basic 
sanctity of private property or other pillars of capitalism, but did modestly improve the 
political and working conditions of Bolivian labour. Código Busch, the first modern labour 
code in Bolivian history, was likely the most important legislation introduced under that 
regime. The period of military socialism reached its premature ending in August 937 
when Busch committed suicide, garnering in the act a level of popularity and respectability 
he had never enjoyed in life (Klein, 2003).
Popular sector ascendant populism in Bolivia was then decisively consolidated through 
the nationalist-populist revolution of 952. Between 952 and early 956, the major 
advances of the revolution, those associated to this day with the estado de ’52 (‘state of 
52’), were pushed forward: (i) the nationalization of the three big mining companies and 
the establishment of the state mining company, COMIBOL; (ii) agrarian reform; and (iii) 
universal suffrage (Whitehead, 2003; Dunkerley, 984; Malloy, 970; Mitchell, 977). 
And yet after the initial period in which the MNR was forced to enact major reforms 
due to pressure from popular movements – led by the revolutionary Marxist tin miners 
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–, the MNR quickly turned on the workers with the assistance of US imperialism. In 
alliance with co-opted peasant organizations - placated by the recent land reforms - the 
MNR began reversing the gains of the revolution and rebuilding the army as a means of 
repressing the miners. In 956, an economic stabilization program backed by the IMF 
was introduced, and by the arrival of the 964 right-wing military coup the state had 
developed an elaborate system of divide-and-rule tactics to deal with rural and urban 
popular sectors, repressing the most radical and integrating those who could be integrated 
through cooptation and the divvying out of selective benefits from the state’s purse.
 
With the return of electoral democracy in 982 the country entered into a brief period 
of centre-left rule under the government of the Unidad Democrática Popular (Popular 
Democratic Union (UDP)). This regime was short-lived, ending before schedule in a 
context of hyperinflationary crisis. Following on the UDP’s heels, and taking advantage 
of the economic crisis, a new coalition of right-wing parties under the direction of the 
MNR assumed office and introduced a set of orthodox neoliberal stabilization policies in 
985. Neoliberal restructuring was most intensely pursued between 985 and 20005 until 
its negative social consequences spurred the largest and most militant cycle of popular 
mobilization in all of Latin America between 2000 and 2005. 
This brings us full circle to the presidential victory of Evo Morales in December 2005. 
The MAS administration he leads represents a novel phenomenon in Bolivian politics 
which I call indigenous ascendant populism. It is increasingly apparent that the MAS has 
recreated elements of the legacy of the MNR’s nationalist-populism in a new melange fit 
for the twenty-first century. The government has incorporated some of the language of 
indigenous liberation developed by radical indigenous movements6 but has separated its 
indigenous focus from much of the material reality facing indigenous people (Webber, 
2006c; 2006d). In spite of the fact that indigenous people in Bolivia - who also constitute 
the vast majority of the rural and urban working class - experience racial oppression and 
class exploitation in a profoundly interpenetrating fashion in their everyday lives, the 
MAS government has concluded that a transition to socialism is impossible in the country 
for between 50 to 00 years. Indigenous ascendant populism in this context incorporates 
a diluted ideology of indigenous liberation while foreclosing the possibility of a transition 
to socialism. The MAS has also borrowed from the MNR’s strategy of the 950s in terms 
of seeking to divide the popular movements, control the most important social movement 
organizations, contain rank-and-file activism that exceeds the strict parameters of moderate 
reform, and even repress workers and peasants who are unwilling to submit to the limits of 
populism and subordination to the state.
5  Crabtree et al. (987); Gamarra (994); Gill (997); Grindle (2003); Kohl (2002; 2003; 2004); 
Kohl & Farthing (2006); Kruse (2002); Malloy (99); Mann & Pastor Jr. (989); Sanabria (999); 
Veltmeyer & Tellez (200).
6  Fuentes (2007); Orozco Ramírez (2005); Stefanoni (2003).
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The MAS, beginning in 2002, began to shift from a radically anti-neoliberal and anti-
imperialist political party to a party based on asymmetrical multi-class coalitions, the 
mobilization of popular support within strict parameters, paternalistic and elitist leadership 
(exemplified in the concept of ‘evismo’),7 and instrumental use of ideology. Since coming 
to power, the MAS has sought to limit the organizational autonomy of social movements 
and trade unions. Popular-class indigenous participation is subordinate in the party’s 
asymmetrical coalition because the advancement of the fundamental material interests 
of the popular classes have been seen as less important than maintaining the foundational 
macroeconomic precepts of neoliberalism - fiscal austerity, low-inflationary growth, 
flexible labour markets, and central bank independence.
 
During the first year in government the MAS has sought to mobilize popular support 
at key junctures, but has also sought to restore control over these popular sectors so as 
to preclude the possibility of further radicalization. As our subsequent discussion will 
show, the Cochabamba Conflict is a paradigmatic illustration of this dynamic. While not 
always successful at restraining its social base, the MAS party leadership has tried to 
be paternalistic and elitist by attempting to determine independently the parameters of 
reasonable demands from below and the timing of confrontations with right-wing opposition 
in the eastern lowlands. While few would characterize Morales as a charismatic leader it 
is obvious that the government presents him as a leader “speaking for the underprivileged 
whom he directly represents” (Oxhorn, 998: 225). The fact that he is the first indigenous 
president in a republic with an indigenous majority and a long and sordid history of racism 
is of massive significance in this respect. Popular indigenous movements tend to see in 
Morales a representative of themselves in office.8
In terms of the instrumental use of ambiguous ideology, two recent quotations from the 
party’s top leadership are representative of the mixed messages it consistently sends out. 
Evo Morales recently remarked that, “transnational corporations always provoke conflicts 
to accumulate capital, and the accumulation of capital in a few hands is no solution for 
humanity… And so I have arrived at the conclusion that capitalism is the worst enemy 
of humanity” (Webber, 2007a:9). By contrast, only two months earlier, vice-president 
García Linera suggested: 
We are going to correct the discourse, suspending the unnecessary 
rhetoric, because on top of everything it does not correspond with our 
actual practice… in this year [the first year of the MAS administration] 
there was not a single measure that has affected the middle classes, or even 
the upper classes of Bolivia….We repeat a thousand times: the government 
of president Morales respects private property, respects religion, respects 
7  García Linera (2006b).
8  Personal interview with Sinclair Thomson (Montreal; September 7, 2007). Sinclair Thomson is a 
renowned scholar of Bolivian history. See Thomson (2002) and Hylton and Thomson (2007). 
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healthy business activity, guarantees private participation in education 
and health (Webber, 2007a:19). 
Moreover, to the extent that populist governments tend to downplay or oppose class 
conflict, and stress the non-zero-sum nature of development, the MAS’s actions in the 
conflict in the Huanuni mine (discussed below) conforms tightly with the model. 
Indigenous populism in contemporary Bolivia is best described as ascendant, rather than 
defensive, because the popular classes and indigenous movements are being mobilized on 
the premise that the government represents a challenge to neoliberalism; the movements 
are not being mobilized on the simple basis of defending the further erosion of collective 
rights and benefits previously acquired before the onslaught of neoliberal restructuring. 
The indigenous populism of the MAS is also ascendant in the sense that there have been 
authentic gains in terms of the sheer increase in the public expression of indigenous 
pride since the MAS came to power (Farthing, 2007). At the same time, this is still 
indigenous populism because the MAS regime has retained residual elements of what 
Charles R. Hale (2004) describes as the indio permitido (authorized Indian) of neoliberal 
multiculturalism in Latin America. Hale shows how Latin American states in the 990s 
and 2000s have, in constructing an “authorized Indian,” set the parameters of acceptable 
cultural recognition of indigenous peoples: “certain rights are to be enjoyed on the implicit 
condition that others will not be raised” (2004:8).  In the case of the MAS, the implicit 
condition has evidently proven to be that very few inroads will be made on neoliberalism 
under its watch, provided, that is, that the popular classes and indigenous nations cannot 
rebuild autonomous organizational capacities outside of the governing party to force it to 
implement substantial reforms.
Given the increasing revenue from the booming natural gas sector of the economy, the 
considerable plans of wealth redistribution under the MAS administration are commonly 
emphasized by scholars (Rochlin, 2007). Less frequently explored are the actual patterns 
of social spending of the government in its first year in office. Thus far, Morales has 
stuck to a program of tight austerity, despite major revenue gains. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew at 4.6 percent in 2006, with hydrocarbon revenues increasing from 5 percent 
of GDP in 2004 to 3.3 percent in 2006. Figures available for 2007 through the month 
of May show hydrocarbon revenue has increased a further 26 percent relative to the 
same period in 2006. The country closed 2006 with a fiscal surplus of 4.6 percent of 
GDP9, “an unnecessarily high level of savings for a country with immense investment 
needs,” according to the conservative Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2007b). In 2006, 
according to Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE), there 
was a year-on-year rise in infrastructure investments, but social investment actually fell 
by 6 percent (EIU, 2007a). Another report indicates that total government expenditures 
(combined public sector) increased by a mere 2.6 percent of GDP between 2004 and 
9  Weisbrot & Sandoval (2007).
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2006, from 33 to 35.6 percent. These low levels of spending are accompanied by soaring 
hydrocarbons revenues, high prices for other Bolivian commodities on the international 
market, and a relatively low total foreign debt amounting to 6 percent of GDP after recent 
debt cancellations by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. In this 
context, Bolivia recorded a current account surplus of .9 percent of GDP and amassed 
$3.9 billion in international reserves, equivalent to 32 percent of GDP. Official poverty 
levels, meanwhile, have decreased at an underwhelming rate, from 63. percent in 2003 to 
approximately 59.9 percent in 2006 (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2007).
Having introduced the theoretical concept of indigenous ascendant populism it makes 
sense to turn now to a detailed examination of two major incidents of popular mobilization 
in 2006 and 2007. This focus will help to clarify the limits of demands from below deemed 
to be acceptable by the current government, as well as highlight the MAS’s relationship 
to autonomous self-organization and mobilization on the part of radical Bolivian social 
movements. We find that both the case of the conflict in a Huanuni mine in October 2006 
and that of the Cochabamba Conflict in late 2006 and early 2007 bolster the argument for 
characterizing the Morales government as indigenous ascendant populist.
Class Struggle in the Mines
The policy and class dynamics in mining for the first several months of the new government 
indicated dramatic limits to the depth of reforms the MAS was willing to contemplate.  In 
its electoral platform for the December 2005 elections, the party proposed the rehabilitation 
of the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation, COMIBOL) and the 
nationalization of the mines (CEDLA, 2006b). However, upon entering office, the MAS 
began immediately to promote new ‘shared risk’ contracts between transnational mining 
corporations and the privileged sectors of the cooperative mining sector. This is set against 
a backdrop of rising commodity prices driven to a large extent by China’s rapid economic 
growth. Nickel and tin prices increased more than 8 percent in 2006, for example, while 
Chinese officials estimate 8 percent GDP growth in 2007 on the back of 0.7 percent in 
2006, the highest rate registered since 995 (Nguyen & Rong, 2007).
The case of the largest iron deposit in the world, Mutún, located in the department 
of Santa Cruz, is an important example of the early position taken by the MAS (Los 
Tiempos, 2007d). For decades Mutún lay dormant. Recently, however, spurred by the 
explosion of demand for iron in China, transnational corporations made clear their interest 
in exploiting the giant iron deposit. MAS eventually granted Jindal Steel & Power, an 
Indian multinational, the prized exploiting license and mining is scheduled to begin on 
24 September 2007. The government argues that the deal will result in $US200 million 
annually in tax revenue. However, some economists have pointed out that of the 50 million 
tons of iron which Jindal will likely extract each year, 95 percent will leave the country in 
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raw form, with only 5 percent being industrialized in Bolivia. Mutún is thought to contain 
40 billion tons of ore, valued at approximately $US30 billion at today’s prices (CEDLA, 
2006a). A number of critical economists have pointed out that Mutún represents a failed 
opportunity of historic proportions. The MAS government was in a position to have used 
this window of opportunity to help reconstruct COMIBOL such that the state company 
could once again play a protagonistic role in the country’s mines. Not only would this have 
assisted in wrestling control from transnational corporate influence in Bolivia, it would 
have provided more revenue for meeting the needs of the impoverished population.
Since the mass privatizations and lay-offs in the mid-980s, the Bolivian mining industry 
has been essentially divided into two sets of workers. The first, organized through the 
Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Mine Workers Union Federation, 
FSTMB), are employed by the state mining company COMIBOL. The FSTMB was the 
heart of arguably the most militant and revolutionary trade union movement in Latin 
America for much of the twentieth century (Dunkerley, 984; Nash, 993; Sanabria, 999). 
The second set consists of self-employed cooperative miners, cooperativistas, organized 
through the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Bolivia (National Federation of 
Cooperative Miners of Bolivia (FENCOMIN)). Many of the cooperative miners barely 
subsist and engage in intense self-exploitation in order to survive, while a privileged sector 
does much better. Much of cooperative mining functions on the same principles as private 
enterprises, whereby some coop members are in a position to exploit others. Wealthier 
cooperative miners contract work out to their ‘business associates’ (poorer cooperative 
members) who are made to labour in the most horrendous working conditions. The 
workers in these relationships are not paid a salary, but instead receive a small portion of 
whatever they are able to extract from the mines. Increasingly, these workers are women 
and children. The workers in these settings, unlike COMIBOL workers, have no security, 
no fixed salaries, no benefits, and are not provided protection from existing labour laws 
(Guachalla, 2006). In the recent past, the national leadership of FENCOMIN formed 
alliances with neoliberal political actors, including mining magnate and reviled ex-
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Bolpress, 2006c).
It is the privileged layer of cooperative miners that was initially represented in the MAS 
government through the Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy. Walter Villarroel, a former 
leader of the FENCOMIN and a registered member of the cooperative ‘La Salvadora’ 
of Huanuni, was made Minister of Mining and Metallurgy in the first MAS cabinet of 
January 2006. With the elevation in commodity prices, class struggle has intensified in 
the mines of the western altiplano (high plateau). The privileged cooperative miners have 
accelerated their attempts to press the government into facilitating shared risk contracts 
between cooperative miners and transnational mining companies. They also have stepped 
up efforts to take over mines currently operated by COMIBOL, such as Huanuni, Caracollo, 
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Barrosquira, Telamayu, and Colquiri. These takeovers and the politics of the cooperative 
miners have been resisted by the FSTMB which has demanded that COMIBOL be restored 
to its former, formidable status as an important state enterprise (La Prensa, 2006c; La 
Razón, 2006a). Battle lines were drawn early for a bloody confrontation which would 
play itself out in October, the outcome of which led to apparent shifts in the government’s 
position on mining. The depth of theses shifts are still unclear.
At a general assembly of the miners’ federation, FSTMB, on July 4, 2006, miners agreed 
to mount pressure on the MAS government to nationalize the mines without compensation 
to transnational companies, to rebuild the state mining company, COMIBOL, and, finally, 
to establish collective workers’ control of COMIBOL and the mines (Econoticias, 2006d). 
At the end of September, the miners initiated the concrete battle for these resolutions in a 
bold fashion. Over 200 miners and ,000 indigenous peasant allies blocked the highways 
connecting Oruro to Cochabamba and Potosí, cutting off traffic flow to much of western 
Bolivia. Immediate demands included the creation of ,500 new jobs and investment 
commitments for the reconstruction of COMIBOL into a functional enterprise. These 
transitional reforms were meant to prefigure full nationalization and workers’ control in 
the future. President Morales himself had at various junctures called for the nationalization 
of the mining industry, although in practice the government had in fact put its emphasis on 
safeguarding a secure investment climate for foreign capital. The government responded 
to the miners and peasants in September by publicly denouncing them as ‘provocateurs’ 
and ‘Trotskyists.’  Minister Villarroel told the press that the protesters were impeding the 
government’s search for foreign investment to reactivate the mining sector. A frustrated 
Villarroel reminded the miners: “The government guaranteed legal security for foreign 
companies to invest in mining” (La Razón, 2006e). 
In early October, the conflict intensified dramatically. The epicentre of events was 
a tin mine in the mountain of Posokoni in the community of Huanuni, but the wider 
repercussions of the situation quickly resonated throughout the country. The mine contains 
the largest deposit of tin in South America, and the tin’s purity and accessibility make it 
a hot commodity. This is particularly so given current trends in the world market. On 
February 22, 2007, for the first time in over 20 years, one ton of tin surpassed $US4,000 
on the London Metal Exchange (The Economist, 2007b). Huanuni is a town of 9, 428 
mostly indigenous inhabitants, located roughly 45 kilometres outside of the city of Oruro, 
in the province of Pantaleón Dalence, in the department of Oruro. The Huanuni tin mine is 
primarily worked by employees of COMIBOL who are organized in the Sindicato Mixto 
de Trabajadores de Mineros de Huanuni (SMTMH), which, in turn, is affiliated with the 
FSTMB at the national level. Cooperative miners also work sections of the Huanuni mine, 
but in far fewer numbers.
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On the afternoon of October 5, 2006, organized cooperative miners led an assault on the 
Huanuni mine in an effort to take it over. COMIBOL miners fought back and a running 
battle with exploding dynamite and street fighting spread from the mines into the town 
centre over two days. Houses were burnt to the ground, tires packed with explosives rolled 
down the mountainside into the town erupting in huge explosions, and the number of dead 
and injured escalated. The FSTMB and the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers’ 
Central (COB)) called on the government to send in troops to protect the state miners 
and the community from the violence initiated by the cooperative miners, but to no avail. 
Seven hundred police were sent in on October 5, but were apparently unable to stop the 
fighting which persisted through October 6. The military was put in a ‘state of alert’ but the 
executive order to intervene was not forthcoming. Morales, in the meantime, conspicuously 
refrained from making a public statement. Human rights ombudsman, Waldo Albarracín, 
and the Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, were eventually able to broker a 
truce which ended the violence, but not before at least 7 people were killed and numerous 
others injured.20 
On the surface, the state-employed miners of COMIBOL achieved some gains from their 
mobilizations and road blockades in September and their defence of the Huanuni mine in 
October. Villarroel was forced to resign from the Ministry of Mines and Metallurgy. He 
was replaced by José Guillermo Dalence, an ex-leader of the FSTMB. Additionally, Hugo 
Miranda Rendón was granted the position of interim President of COMIBOL. Until this 
appointment, Miranda Rendón had been the workers’ representative on the directorship 
of COMIBOL. Moreover, Morales publicly admitted that, “Until now in the issue of 
mining we have not complied with the Bolivian people” (La Razón, 2006h). Morales then 
reasserted the intention of the MAS to nationalize the mining industry (Keane, 2006a).
However, the underlying conflicts hardly disappeared. In early February 2007, 20,000 
members of the cooperative miners’ federation, FENCOMIN, launched a large protest 
in La Paz against the nationalization of the mines. The MAS government subsequently 
20  Bolpress (2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2006e); Econoticias (2006a; 2006e); Keane (2006b); 
Associated Press (2006); La Razón  (2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2006f).
Table I: Clashes in the Mines, Huanuni – October 5-6, 2006
Participants Demands Govt Response
FSTMB
FENCOMIN
Townspeople
Indigenous Peasant 
Movements
FSTMB: Nationalization; Rebuild 
COMIBOL; Worker’s Control.
FENCOMIN: Expansion of 
cooperative mines in the altiplano; 
alliances with transnational mining 
corporations; reduction of COMIBOL 
activities in mining industry
Initial support for FENCOMIN; 
Opposed FSTMB demands; 
Refusal to militarily protect 
FSTMB miners and families; 
in the aftermath, facilitated 
resignation of Minister of Mining 
and Metallurgy; promise to 
nationalize mining sector at 
undisclosed date in the future
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shifted its plan of “nationalization” to a watered-down proposal to increase taxes on 
private mining companies (The Economist, 2007a). Nonetheless, on February 9, Morales 
repeated the theatrical tactics he employed during the 2006 May Day presidential decree 
on natural gas2, this time announcing the nationalization of the Empresa Metalúrgica 
Vinto tin smelter, the fourth-largest in the world, as military troops stood by his side 
(The Economist, 2007b). While the details of this nationalization are not yet clear, it 
would appear that the measure remains isolated from general mining policy. The Bolivian 
government claims, for example, that in this specific instance the sale in 2005 of the 
Vinto smelter to Glencore, a Swiss multinational, was based on fraud. Dalence, the new 
Minister of Mining and Metallurgy, claims that, “The plant was taken from the Bolivian 
people fraudulently and we are reclaiming it” (The Economist, 2007a). At the same time, 
Dalence’s message to transnational mining capital more generally is as follows: “All 
foreign companies that operate within the legal framework have our guarantee that they 
won’t be touched” (The Economist, 2007a).  As The Economist  (2007a) editorializes: “In 
October he said it was the turn of mining [to be nationalized]. Yet with Mr. Morales, whose 
rallying cry is ‘Bolivian resources for the Bolivian people’, sometimes the symbolism and 
the rhetoric is more ambitious than the reality” (The Economist, 2007a).
In summary, the conduct of the MAS administration in general mining policy and 
specifically in the case of the Huanuni crisis confirms the thesis of indigenous ascendant 
populism. The independent revolutionary socialist demands and strategies of the FSTMB 
miners were denounced as provocative and ‘Trotskyist’ by MAS officials. The MAS has 
sought to avoid open class conflict in the mines and characterizes the relationship between 
workers and transnational mining corporations in non-zero-sum terms. The interests of 
the two distinct groups are not seen as conflicting. FENCOMIN has been favoured as 
a counterweight against the radical demands of the FSTMB because the latter’s politics 
will necessarily clash with the interests of transnationals. Morales, at various junctures, 
has employed a radical rhetoric of ‘nationalization’ but its meaning in the mining industry 
has been highly ambiguous thus far, accompanied as it is by assurances to transnational 
companies that they will not be touched if they play by the rules.
Cochabamba de pie, nunca de rodillas! Cochabamba on its Feet, Never on its 
Knees!
A second challenge to the MAS administration from the left occurred during what I refer 
to here as the Cochabamba Conflict, beginning in late December 2006 and coming to a 
gradual close by the end of January 2007 (see Table I). The conflict illustrates the extent 
to which the MAS is willing to facilitate mobilization of generally loyal social sectors 
within strict parameters to achieve or sustain a favourable balance of forces at particular 
conjunctures vis-à-vis the autonomist right. On the other hand, it also exemplifies the 
ways in which popular movements are sometimes capable of transcending these set 
parameters and forging an autonomous path to the left of the government, even if only 
2  Webber (2006a).
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temporarily. Further, the Cochabamba Conflict highlights the manner in which the MAS 
will opportunistically withdraw its most loyal bases – the cocaleros, for example – from 
mobilizing tactics that threaten to transcend moderate, legalistic reformism. It also seems 
clear from the events in Cochabamba that, thus far, the social bases closest to the MAS 
will still, by and large, comply with the line of the party issued from La Paz at the end 
of the day. The Cochabamba Conflict suggests that while there is a limited presence of 
political currents to the left of the MAS in some of the major social movements, their 
influence has been ephemeral so far. Finally, in the case of the Cochabamba Conflict 
the far left’s call for the formation of a parallel revolutionary departmental government 
was ultimately reckless adventurism because the social forces necessary to realize such a 
government were no longer mobilized.
Table II: Chronology of the Cochabamba Conflict
December 15, 2006 – Cochabamba Prefect, Manfred Reyes Villa, proposes a new 
referendum on departmental autonomy for Cochabamba despite the fact that 63 
percent of the department’s electorate voted “No” in the last nation-wide departmental 
autonomies referendum held only months earlier, on July 2, 2006.
December 20 – A popular assembly of cocaleros, factory workers, teachers, university 
students, and others, is held in the Plaza 4 de Septiembre, the central plaza in downtown 
Cochabamba. The assembly rejects the Prefect’s call for a new referendum. A tear gas 
grenade is tossed into the crowd, and the social movements accuse functionaries of the 
Prefect of culpability in the incident. Indigenous peasants, cocaleros, and urban popular 
sectors in Cochabamba initiate a vigil outside of the offices of Reyes Villa demanding 
his resignation.
December 21 – The Central Obrera Departamental (Departmental Workers Central, 
COD) hosts another popular assembly of social movements and trade unionists in which 
it is decided that protests against Reyes Villa be postponed until after Christmas and the 
New Year to ensure greater participation.
January 4, 2007 – Rural and urban popular movements mobilize in Cochabamba 
city and re-open vigil outside of the offices of the Prefect, and occupy Plaza 4 de 
Septiembre.
January 8 – Social movements reinforce their occupation of the Plaza 4 de Septiembre 
and set fire to the entrance of the Prefect’s office building. Reyes Villa escapes in a 
bullet proof car and flees to La Paz. Protesters demanding Reyes Villa’s resignation are 
tear gassed by police.
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January 9 – Negotiations to pacify the region are convened, first by Vice Minister Fabián 
Yacsik, and then by Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana. Negotiations are 
a failure.
January 10 – A ‘civic march’ is organized by supporters of Reyes Villa, demanding that 
‘campesinos’ (peasants), respect the city. The civic march declares the attempted burning 
of the offices of the prefect a ‘humiliation.’ The Civic Committee of Cochabamba, 
which is aligned with Reyes Villa, announces an indefinite civic strike. The presence of 
a proto-fascist youth group is reported for the first time in Cochabama. The group calls 
itself, Juventud por la Democracia (Youth for Democracy, JD), and is modelled on the 
Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (Cruceño Youth Union, UJC) of Santa Cruz.
January 11 – The most violent confrontations of the Cochabamba conflict take place. 
Right-wing ‘civic groups’ and the JD clash with rural and urban popular movements in 
the Plaza de Las Banderas, Plaza 4 de Septiembre, and Plaza Colón. Two people are 
killed – one on each side – and more than 200 are injured, the majority of whom are of 
the popular movements according to press reports released by journalists upon visiting 
the hospitals. Many of the injured are gravely injured by bullets, beatings, and other 
outcomes of the fierce street fighting.
January 12 – Social movements insist on the resignation of the Prefect in a massive 
concentration of tens of thousands in the Plaza 4 de Septiembre. Reyes Villa retreats 
from his call for a new referendum for departmental autonomy in Cochabamba. 
Leaders of the cocaleros and other indigenous peasant sectors announce the lifting of 
road blockades of the interdepartmental highways in response to Reyes Villa’s partial 
concession and pleas from the MAS government to end the blockades and guarantee 
free transit of people, goods, and vehicles. In reality, some of the rank-and-file of the 
peasant unions refuse to lift the blockades and mainstream media reports indicate 
the persistence of intermittent and/or permanent blockades in various parts of the 
department contributing to ongoing traffic congestion or paralysis.
January 13 – Ramón Quintana meets with social movements closely aligned with 
the MAS, seeking to define a basis upon which dialogue with Reyes Villa might be 
initiated. Reyes Villa accepts dialogue with the government in theory, but demands that 
negotiations take place in Santa Cruz, where he now is located after having travelled 
from La Paz. The rank-and-file of the cocaleros and other indigenous peasant movements 
return to the streets demanding the resignation of Reyes Villa. The MAS refuses to 
negotiate with Reyes Villa in Santa Cruz and accuses the Prefect of Cochabamba of 
reneging on his duties as Prefect by abandoning the department in a moment of crisis.
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January 16 – Reyes Villa refuses to resign in a televised message from Santa Cruz 
addressing the entire country. Reyes Villa assigns Johnny Ferrel, secretary general of 
the Prefecture, the duties of the Prefect for the duration of Reyes Villa’s exile in Santa 
Cruz. A Popular Assembly of tens of thousands of cocaleros, indigenous peasants, 
peasant irrigators, the COD, university students, informal proletarians, formal workers, 
neighbourhood organizations of the poorer zones of Cochabamba, teachers, and many 
others, hold a popular assembly in the Plaza 4 de Septiembre. A ‘legal exit’ to the 
crisis through a proposed law that might make possible the forced resignation of Reyes 
Villa through a referendum is suggested to the assembly by leaders, affiliated with the 
MAS, of the peasant irrigators, the COD, and the cocaleros, among others. This is 
not coincidentally the position of the MAS government from La Paz. A large part of 
the rank-and-file reject this position of the leadership, denounce the social movement 
and trade union leadership in loud voices, and demand the resignation of Reyes Villa 
immediately. While there are divisions in the rank-and-file, currents of the radical Left 
are able to hold significant sway in this moment. A Revolutionary Prefecture Government 
is declared, consisting of 5 members of an executive committee who represent various 
social movement and trade union sectors. Tiburcio Herradas Lamas is elected president 
of the executive. A successful occupation and take over of the offices of the COD is 
staged by the new parallel government. The MAS immediately denounces the popular 
departmental government as illegal and undemocratic and asserts that Reyes Villa 
remains the principal, legitimate political authority of Cochabamba who cannot be 
removed through street demonstrations or popular assemblies.
January 17-20 – The Revolutionary Prefecture Government is unable to translate its 
declarations into actions and the exercise of power. The MAS successfully draws away 
from the parallel government the rank-and-file of the cocaleros, indigenous peasants, 
and parts of the COD. Meanwhile, attempts at mass mobilizations and a civic strike by 
radical social movements in El Alto and the altiplano do not receive mass support in the 
last instance. The latter movements were demanding the resignation of the right-wing 
Prefect of La Paz, José Paredes, in an act of solidarity with the Cochabamba popular 
movements against the destabilizing tactics of right-wing autonomist forces throughout 
the country.
January 22 – Highly-attended festivities take over the streets of La Paz as the MAS 
government sponsors celebrations of its first year in office. The Cochabamba conflict all 
but disappears from the national political scene and has yet to reignite, despite the fact 
that the underlying causes have not been resolved.
This table was compiled through a qualitative analysis of the following media sources 
between December 5, 2006 and January 22, 2007: Los Tiempos, La Prensa, La Razón, 
Bolpress, El Deber and Econoticias
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Cochabamba entered the international media spotlight briefly during the Cochabamba 
Water War of 2000, when a popular rural and urban movement rose up against a World 
Bank-driven privatization of the city’s water.22  This rebellion became a powerful referent 
in the global justice movement internationally. On the domestic scene it sparked the 
insurrectionary left-indigenous cycle of revolt which lasted for the next five years. The 
narrative of the Cochabamba Conflict under investigation here begins on December 
5, 2006 when right-wing Cochabamba Prefect, Manfred Reyes Villa, proposed a new 
referendum on autonomy for the department. This proposal was issued during an open-air 
town hall meeting23, even though roughly six months earlier, on July 2, 2006, 63 percent 
of the department’s electorate rejected autonomy in a nation-wide referendum. Hence, 
while Reyes Villa was elected with 47.6 percent of the vote in the prefecture elections of 
December 2005 (the MAS came second with 43.), by no stretch of the imagination did 
he enjoy a mandate for establishing departmental autonomy. His actions on December 
5, therefore, were perceived by the Bolivian left generally, and in particular by the 
popular movements in Cochabamba, as a bold unilateral shift of Cochabamba’s official 
departmental politics toward an alliance with the autonomist right of the media luna. 
It would require wilful blindness to miss the connections between Reyes Villa and 
the autonomist movement of the media luna. Most obviously, it was Reyes Villa’s 
announcement on 5 December that he was planning on holding a new referendum on 
autonomy which provoked the Cochabamba Conflict in the first place. When he fled 
Cochabamba in a bullet proof car at the outset of the worst clashes he headed toward La 
Paz where he met with the prefects of the media luna. From there he subsequently took 
refuge in Santa Cruz for the duration of the Cochabamba crisis. From Santa Cruz, the 
leading umbrella organization of the autonomist movement, the Comité Pro Santa Cruz 
(Pro Santa Cruz Committee (CPSC)), organized repeated demonstrations in the eastern 
part of the country in defence of Reyes Villa and against the alleged authoritarianism of 
the MAS government and the popular uprisings opposed to Reyes Villa in the streets of 
Cochabamba city. Finally, personnel from the offices of the Cochabamba Prefecture have 
been accused by many popular movement actors of having been part of the formation 
of the Juventud por la Democracia (Youth for Democracy (JD)), a violent, proto-fascist 
youth group in Cochabamba modeled on the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (Cruceño Youth 
Union, UJC) of Santa Cruz (Arcadio, 2007; La Prensa, 2007b; 2007d; La Razón, 2007e; 
Los Tiempos, 2007a; 2007e).
It was in the interests of the MAS government, therefore, to prevent an extension of the 
media luna’s influence into Cochabamba through the person of Reyes Villa, without at 
the same time undermining their negotiations with the bourgeois autonomist forces over 
the Constituent Assembly’s content and procedural rules. This was a delicate balance to 
manufacture, indeed. The MAS government, through its bases in the regantes (peasant 
22  Albro (2005); Assies (2003); Olivera & Lewis (2004); Spronk & Webber (2007).
23  Los Tiempos (2007m).
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irrigators) and cocaleros of Cochabamba, as well as through the masista leadership of 
Cochabamba’s Central Obrera Departamental (Departmental Workers Central (COD)), 
appears to have attempted to mobilize demonstrations and road blockades with the aim 
of simply constraining the capacity of the Prefect of Cochabamba and the Cochabamba 
Civic Committee to align themselves more fully with the autonomist movement of the 
media luna (Econoticias, 2006a).  It was on this basis that cocaleros, indigenous peasant 
sectors, the COD, and popular urban movements began their vigil in front of the offices of 
the Prefecuture on January 4, 2007. However, the demands emanating from the grassroots 
of the rural and urban social movements that gathered in Cochabamba radicalized 
substantially as protesters were first repressed by police on January 8 and then were led 
into vicious battles by violent counter-demonstrators in the street fights of January , 
leaving two dead and over 200 injured, many seriously. This context of concentrated 
struggle, confrontation, repression, and violence – in addition to influence exercised in 
the demonstrations and assemblies by organized, Trotskyist university students – led the 
mobilized popular forces on the ground to escape temporarily the limits of the MAS party 
line and forcefully call for the immediate resignation of Reyes Villa (Bolpress, 2007b; 
2007c; Econoticias, 2007a; 2007c; Lora Ortuño, 2007).
The first escalation of social movement tactics and demands can be traced to January 8. 
Social movements reinforced the numbers of protesters who were already occupying the 
central plaza of the city, the Plaza 4 de Septiembre, and continued the vigil in front of the 
offices of the Prefect. As the day progressed, however, crowds attempted to gain access to 
the building of the prefecture. While prevented from taking over the prefecture by volleys 
of tear gas canisters fired by the police, protesters were able to set fire to the door of the 
building and two cars in the streets. One witness reported:
 
Dumpsters were knocked over, piles of garbage were on fire, two cars were burning, 
and the door to the government office was completely burned and in flames. Not a 
single police officer was on the plaza any longer because they all had taken cover 
inside the government headquarters. Every few minutes a window would open and 
tear gas canisters would be fired into the plaza. If we were lucky a valiant person 
would rush to the canister, pick it up, and throw it back at the police…. At the end of 
the day the conflict had resulted in 33 injured, destroyed vehicles, and an entire part 
of the center plaza burned down (Tarlau, 2007).
It was during these events that Reyes Villa escaped in a bullet-proof vehicle headed 
toward La Paz (Los Tiempos, 2007m). The following day, the central government sent 
Vice Minister, Fabián Yacsik, and Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, to 
Cochabamba to initiate negotiations with the social movements and representatives of 
the Prefect and his allies in the Cochabamba Civic Committee. None of the stakeholders 
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were willing to entertain negotiations, however, their positions having been substantially 
hardened after the incidents on January 8. Two days later, on January 0, a ‘civic march’ 
was staged by right-wing middle and upper class supporters of Reyes Villa. During the 
march, racist and patronizing epithets were shouted about the largely indigenous rural 
and urban popular movements present in the city. The Civic Committee declared an 
indefinite civic strike (Los Tiempos, 2007m). By this time, the official position of the MAS 
government with regard to the social movements was for them to respect the legitimacy 
of Reyes Villa. Government officials said he could not be overthrown through popular 
assemblies and street demonstrations because he was democratically elected, despite the 
obvious unpopularity of his position on departmental autonomy.
Elsewhere in the country the events in Cochabamba were beginning to have an impact. In 
La Paz, the Prefects of the media luna departments met with Reyes Villa, while in Santa 
Cruz a gathering of the right-wing civic committees of these departments was scheduled 
for the following day during which tactics were to be defined as to how best to defend 
three goals: support for Reyes Villa, the ‘defence of democracy,’ and the push for the 
two-thirds procedural rule in the Constituent Assembly which would favour the media 
luna’s political allies (La Razón, 2007b).   The rising tensions between January 8 and 0 in 
Cochabamba and elsewhere set the stage for the most concentrated day of violence in the 
Cochabamba Conflict, January .
Violent street battles erupted in the late afternoon. On the one side, primarily middle- and 
upper-class supporters of the Cochabamba Civic Committee and Reyes Villa – organized 
in “civic groups,” the JD, and neighbourhood associations from the wealthy zona norte 
(Northern Zone) of the city – were pitted against the other side – cocaleros, trade unionists, 
indigenous peasants, factory workers, municipal workers, popular neighbourhood 
associations, teachers, construction workers, and the urban poor. Supporters of Reyes Villa 
were armed with wooden clubs (some with knives attached to their ends), baseball bats, 
metal pipes, golf clubs, tennis rackets, and some fire arms. The popular movements were 
armed with many similar makeshift weapons, with the addition of dynamite sticks and the 
absence of fire arms (La Razón, 2007g; Shultz, 2007). Detonations of dynamite and gun 
shots echoed throughout the city streets. Most of the fighting was restricted to battles with 
wooden clubs and hand-to-hand combat; however, the mobilized right-wing also fired into 
the crowds. Barricades were erected in the zona norte to prevent incursions by the popular 
movements, while the latter erected their own barricades in the city centre, paralyzing 
most of the city. Police were instructed by the central government not to repress anyone, 
and therefore restricted their interventions to minimal tear-gassing of spaces separating 
the two sides in the conflict in attempts to keep them apart from one another. Military 
troops did not arrive in the city until the early hours of January 2 (Los Tiempos, 2007c; 
2007f; 2007i; 2007l).
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Forty-two-year-old cocalero, Nicómedes Gutiérrez, was fatally shot in the chest, while 
20-year-old Cristian Urrestia was attacked and killed by social movement sectors when 
he was separated from the rest of his allies in the pro-Reyes Villa bloc. In addition to the 
two fatalities, over 200 injuries were reported, many of them serious, including gun shot 
wounds to the chest and life-threatening head injuries (La Prensa, 2007a; Los Tiempos, 
2007g; 2007p; 2007r). Solidarity demonstrations by popular sectors in rebellious city of 
El Alto were organized by FEJUVE-El Alto (the United Neighbourhood Associations of 
El Alto) and Central Obrera Regional - El Alto (Regional Workers’ Central of El Alto, 
COR-El Alto) in which hundreds of demonstrators tried to block access to the main airport 
in the western part of the country, located in that city. In Santa Cruz, meanwhile, the right-
wing civic committee declared a 24 hour strike in defence of the rule of law and Reyes 
Villa, and resolved to convoke a cruceño assembly on January 2 (La Razón, 2007a). 
During this time, Morales was in Nicaragua attending the inauguration of newly-elected 
President Daniel Ortega, and did not return to Bolivia until the early morning of January 
2 (La Razón, 2007c). García Linera was therefore acting-president of the country in 
Morales’ absence and he expressed the government’s official distance from the radicalizing 
social movements on the ground in Cochabamba: “The government reaffirms the search 
for solutions to the tensions and political conflicts through dialogue and respect for the 
constitution” (Los Tiempos, 2007h). Both García Linera and Ramón Quintana stressed the 
fact that they respected the constitution and recognized the legitimacy of Reyes Villa as 
prefect of Cochabamba. At the same time, García Linera blamed Reyes Villa’s intransigence 
for the violence. Reyes Villa, for his part, fixed the onus on the MAS government which 
he accused of manufacturing the entire crisis through the mobilization of its social bases 
in Cochabamba. Reyes Villa reiterated that he would not resign (La Prensa, 2007c; La 
Razón, 2007f; Los Tiempos, 2007e). On the ground in Cochabamba, numerous sources 
reported the discord between the radicalizing position of the social movements and the 
calming words of reconciliation, compromise, and negotiation on offer from the MAS 
government. For example, Julio Salazar, leader of the Federación de Trabajadores del 
Trópico de Cochabamba, a central peasant union federation of the cocalero movement, 
told the press that because of the violence on January , the peasants no longer considered 
Reyes Villa the Prefect of Cochabamba, demanded a new prefect to take his place, and 
announced that they would not cease pressure tactics, including mass mobilization and 
road blockades, until the prefect resigned (Los Tiempos, 2007g).
The following day, on January 2, violence was circumvented by the presence of over 
,500 military troops in the city which had arrived overnight. A tense calm saturated the 
city, with only sporadic confrontations between anti-riot police and university students 
(La Razón, 2007j). Popular social movements continued to occupy the city centre and 
persisted in demanding the resignation of Reyes Villa. Meanwhile, Morales had returned 
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from Nicaragua and addressed the country with two televised speeches. In the morning 
he asked the social movements in Cochabamba to avoid vengeance and cease all violence. 
In the second presentation in the evening he suggested that the MAS government was 
drafting a proposed law for consideration in Congress which would allow for the revoking 
of political authorities from their positions - including Prefects - by popular referendum, 
rather than through mobilization in the streets. The executive also offered to mediate 
dialogue between social movements in Cochabamba and Reyes Villa, but Reyes Villa 
insisted that any negotiations had to take place in Santa Cruz, where he had now based 
himself after travelling from La Paz. At the same time, Reyes Villa retreated from his 
earlier position regarding the new referendum on departmental autonomy that he had 
called for on December 5 (Arcadio, 2007; La Razón, 2007d; 2007e).
 
Again, the sentiments of the rank-and-file of the social movements still occupying the 
city did not closely parallel the position of the MAS government. Reyes Villa’s ostensible 
concession was too little, too late in their eyes. A popular assembly organized by the COD 
in the Plaza 4 de Septiembre, for example, closed the day by passing three resolutions: that 
Reyes Villa must resign immediately; that measures of mobilization and pressure tactics 
be intensified to accelerate his forced resignation; and that in order to best compel the 
resignation social movements ought to take over and occupy the properties owned by the 
prefect in Cochabamba (La Razón, 2007j).  At the same time, the government registered 
some success in having various cocalero and other peasant sectors in the department lift 
road blockades in rural areas, even if some blockades continued to impede the flow of 
interdepartmental traffic (La Razón, 2007h; Stefanoni, 2007; Los Tiempos, 2007q). 
Between January 3 and 5, a general stalemate persisted, with Reyes Villa continuing to 
refuse to return to Cochabamba, the social movements maintaining their contention that he 
must resign, and the MAS attempting to mediate between the two sides through negotiation 
and dialogue (Los Tiempos, 2007j; 2007k; 2007o). On January 6, an unsuccessful attempt 
was made by Trotskyist currents, mostly rooted in the public university of Cochabamba, to 
build on the discontent of the rank-and-file and push the contradictions of the Cochabamba 
Conflict toward a revolutionary, parallel departmental government. At a popular assembly 
convened by the COD that day, between 0,000 and 30,000 (La Jornada, 2007; Sánchez, 
2007) people - cocaleros, regantes, rural and urban teachers, poor neighbourhood activists, 
highschool and university students, transport workers, unorganized sectors of the urban 
poor, and others - gathered in the Plaza 4 de Septiembre. The majority of the speakers 
vehemently spoke against the legal exit to the crisis proposed by the MAS government. 
Rather, they called for such things as the strengthening of the struggle against Reyes 
Villa, his immediate replacement by a new prefect, and revolutionary struggle against the 
Bolivian oligarchy. The crowd chanted ‘Possession! Possession!’ which was a call for the 
take over of the Prefecture by the popular assembly. 
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There were but a few speakers at the assembly who adopted the MAS line being issued 
from La Paz. Omar Velasco, secretary general of the COD, representing this line, said 
he realized emotions were heated but that the social movements nonetheless had to stay 
within the boundaries of legality. Omar Fernández, leader of the regantes and a MAS 
senator, also called for a legal exit, while Víctor Mitma of the COD echoed Morales in 
calling for calm and an end to violence. Fernández argued: “The assembly is sovereign 
and its resolutions must be obeyed, but within legal parameters” (Los Tiempos, 2007b).24 
Likewise, Severo Huanca, secretary of the Seis Federaciones del Trópico Cochabambino, 
the peak organization of the cocaleros, supported a legal exit and respect for constitutional 
rules (Bolpress, 2007a). These speakers were pilloried with insults from university 
students, transport workers, and other sectors of the crowd. The moderate leadership 
of the cocaleros and the COD were attempting to pass resolutions in the assembly 
completely at odds with the sentiments of the crowd (Red Erbol, 2007b). The moderates 
ended their speeches with a call for a legal path to Reyes Villa’s resignation as well as a 
trial of responsibilities for the Cochabamba Prefect regarding his role in precipitating the 
violent deaths of January . One reporter with the conservative Santa Cruz newspaper El 
Deber noted: “The discontent [with the position of the moderate leadership] was almost 
unanimous [casi general]” (Sánchez, 2007).
Pressure from below at the popular assembly grew to a level where the departmental 
councillors of Cochabamba who were present in the Plaza felt compelled to convene 
an emergency meeting in the offices of the COD. The social movements in the Plaza 
demanded that the departmental councillors censure Reyes Villa and name a new prefect. 
Over dissenting voices of moderate social movement and trade union leaders affiliated with 
the MAS, the councillors present did in fact resolve to censure Reyes Villa and to ask the 
social movements in the Plaza to elect a new Prefect.  However, by this stage divisions in 
the rank-and-file had become more visible, as the leadership of the social movements and 
unions closely aligned with the MAS pressured the bases to disband from the assembly. 
Meanwhile, Marco Ríos, leader of the most vocal sector of the radical Left, the Federación 
Universitaria Local (Local University Federation (FUL)), spoke in favour of the creation of 
armed antifascist groups to defend transformative change against the reactionary political 
tactics of the media luna autonomist forces. At this point, according to various accounts, 
the cocaleros, the COD, the regantes, and the Federación Bartolina Sisa retreated with 
their memberships, leaving in the Plaza only a minority of the 0,000 to 30,000 initially 
gathered, with the FUL playing a predominant leadership role in the remaining group (La 
Razón, 2007i; Sánchez, 2007). The reduced group declared the formation of a parallel 
Revolutionary Departmental Government and elected 5 representatives - primarily 
24  Fernández’s position at this time is especially noteworthy because earlier in the conflict he made 
more radical statements in favour of continued mobilization against Reyes Villa. These distanced 
himself from the leadership of the MAS at the national level. As the conflict wore on, however, it 
appears party discipline effectively reigned him in to the official line. Thanks to Susan Spronk for 
reminding me of the trajectory of the senator’s position in this regard.
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university students, transport workers, and representatives of neighbourhood associations 
- to the parallel government’s comité popular, or popular committee.  Tiburcio Herradas 
Lamas became the president of the new ‘revolutionary’ formation (Los Tiempos, 2007n).25 
After unsuccessfully attempting to enter the offices of the Prefecture which was protected 
by police forces, the new ‘parallel government’ convened a press conference at the COD 
offices and invited the media to another press conference scheduled for the following 
morning. Meanwhile, Reyes Villa had taken advantage of the confusion and returned to 
Cochabamba under the protection of the police (Sánchez, 2007).
The inability of the parallel government to carry through with their declarations became 
obvious almost immediately. The MAS government produced a barrage of public 
statements, press conferences, and televised addresses denouncing the formation of a 
parallel government as illegal Herradas Lamas was a former comrade of García Linera’s 
in the short-lived guerrilla organization, the Ejército Guerrillero Tupaj Katari (Tupaj 
Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)) of the late 980s and early 990s. Both men, along with 
other comrades of theirs, were incarcerated for five years for their activities in the EGTK 
although neither was formally charged, nor did they receive a trial., and reiterated forcefully 
their defence of Reyes Villa as the legitimate Prefect of Cochabamba. Morales pledged 
his support for the legality of Reyes Villa’s control over Cochabamba. Alex Contreras, 
the official spokesperson for the Presidential Palace, said that, for the Executive, Reyes 
Villa continued to be the first political authority of Cochabamba and that the government 
would not recognize any popular departmental government comprised of radical groups 
of the extreme Left: “We do not recognize the popular departmental government. We 
respect legality and the Political Constitution of the state”(Red Erbol, 2007a). Alfredo 
Rada, Vice Minister of Coordination with Social Movements, echoed Contreras: “We 
consider these radicalized groups of the ultra-Left” (La Razón, 2007i). García Linera said 
that while protests are legitimate, the measures adopted by social movements in relation 
to the revolutionary parallel government are illegal, and that it is imperative to respect 
democratic norms and rules (Sánchez, 2007).
On the afternoon of January 7, Morales met with leaders of the indigenous peasant unions 
of Cochabamba, the cocaleros’ federations, and the COD and was able to persuade them 
to opt for the, still ambiguous, legal strategy of seeking Reyes Villa’s resignation by way 
of an uncertain proposed law for revoking the mandates of political authorities. In the 
absence of support from these key sectors, in conjunction with the inertia, immaturity, 
and limited political organizational capacity of the radical left, the Revolutionary 
Departmental Government had completely dissolved by January 8 2007, only two days 
after its bold declarations. It proved entirely incapable of exercising power, even while 
Reyes Villa remained spectacularly unpopular in the department. Herrada Lamas declared 
25  Herradas Lamas was a former comrade of García Linera’s in the short-lived guerrilla organization, 
the Ejército Guerrillero Tupaj Katari (Tupaj Katari Guerrilla Army, EGTK) of the late 980s and 
early 990s. Both men, along with other comrades of theirs, were incarcerated for five years for their 
activities in the EGTK although neither was formally charged, nor did they receive a trial.
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that the parallel government had been betrayed. He questioned the rural and urban union 
leadership’s loyalty to the MAS, and asked why the radical resolutions of multiple popular 
assemblies were abandoned (Econoticias, 2007b). By January 22, the Cochabamba 
Conflict had faded from the national political scene as massive festivities celebrating the 
first year of the MAS administration were kicked off in La Paz. So long as the underlying 
contradictions that spurred the conflict remain, however, it is only a matter of time before 
they rise to the surface once again.
In summary, the Cochabamba Conflict, like the conflict in Huanuni, provides further 
substantiation for the thesis of indigenous ascendant populism. Most importantly, the 
MAS sought to mobilize its social bases so as to circumvent advances by the far-right 
in Cochabamba while retaining explicit control over the protests. The demands of the 
mobilization were to be strictly defined by the MAS itself rather than the grassroots 
assemblies on the scene. When they transcended the acceptable limits the social movement 
participants were quickly denounced by the government.  
Conclusion
This essay has developed the concept of indigenous ascendant populism to better 
conceptualize the character of the Evo Morales administration in Bolivia. It examined the 
roles of popular sector ascendant and popular sector defensive populism in Latin America 
and situated the Bolivian experience within this broader context. The MAS has reformulated 
components of the MNR’s populist strategy from the 950s, although it has added to it the 
language of indigenous liberation. The class exploitation and material conditions of the 
indigenous majority is not effectively addressed in this schema of indigenous liberation, 
however, because the MAS’s political strategy has not included a confrontation with many 
of the basic economic foundations of neoliberalism. Indigenous ascendant populism, in 
this sense, dilutes the ideology of indigenous liberation developed by radical indigenous 
movements since the 970s, and the left-indigenous demands of the insurrectionary 
mobilizations between 2000 and 2005. The possibility of a transition to socialism in 
the near- to- medium term is explicitly denied in vice-president García Linera’s concept 
of Andean-Amazonian capitalism as well as in the most important development plan 
published by the government thus far. Popular-class indigenous interests are subordinated 
to the interests of capital in the party’s asymmetrical coalition because of the government’s 
commitment to the foundational macroeconomic pillars of neoliberalism - fiscal austerity, 
low-inflationary growth, flexible labour markets, and central bank independence. 
This article has illustrated that during the first year of the MAS administration the 
government has mobilized its social bases at various junctures but within strict parameters 
defined by the government itself. This was apparent both in the case of the Cochabamba 
Conflict when the demands of social movements eventually transcended the goals of the 
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MAS, and in the MAS’s response to the FSTMB’s protests leading up to and during the 
October 2006 crisis in the Huanuni mine. Evo Morales is not a charismatic leader in 
the sense of classical populism, but as the first indigenous president of the republic he is 
seen to be a direct representative of the historically excluded and oppressed indigenous 
majority.   Ideologically the MAS often employs radical rhetoric, particularly with regard 
to ‘nationalization’ in various sectors of the economy. In reality, however, ‘nationalization’ 
has a remarkably restricted scope and assurances are constantly made to important 
sectors of foreign and domestic capital alike that their fundamental interests will not be 
jeopardized. Furthermore, despite large increases in state revenue from soaring natural 
gas prices it was demonstrated that social spending has been notably austere. All of this 
suggests that we need to pay diligent attention to the practice of the MAS rather than 
parroting its rhetoric. The negligence of some analysts in this regard has led them to 
exaggerate the radical nature of the current administration.  
This essay has attempted to draw out some of the complexities of the Bolivian process 
and the character of the MAS government. The mining confrontations of October 2006 
and the urban street battles in January 2007 are but two windows into a whole series of 
dynamic and unpredictable class struggles being played out in the wider political setting. 
The traditions and initiative of the popular classes and oppressed indigenous nations, 
displayed so powerfully in the early years of this century, will need once again to express 
their social power independently of the MAS if their aims and objectives are not to be 
defeated or tamed beyond all recognition under the current government. With this kind 
of renewal of self-activity a deepening of social reforms can be forced along, and even 
the foundations for social transformation constructed. At the same time, the strategic, 
autonomous mobilization of the popular sectors is also the best barrier to the advance of 
the counterrevolutionary autonomist movement in the media luna departments.
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